Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

W. Franklin Stoddard, Water Well and Exploration
Drilling v. Gregory Lynn Biddle and Utah Industrial
Commission : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger F. Baron; Attorney for Petitioner; Sharon Eblen; Attorney for Uninsured Employers\' Fund.
Scott F. Squire; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, W. Franklin Stoddard, Water Well and Exploration Drilling v. Gregory Lynn Biddle and Utah Industrial Commission,
No. 940454 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6112

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

W. FRANKLIN STODDARD, dba
WATER WELL & EXPLORATION
DRILLING,

Court of Appeals of Utah
Case No. 940454-CA

Petitioner,
-vs-

Industrial Commission of Utah
Case No. 92000861

GREGORY LYNN BIDDLE, and the
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Priority No. 7

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GREGORY LYNN BIDDLE

APPEAL FROM ORDER DENYING STODDARD'S MOTIONS FOR REVIEW

SCOTT F. SQUIRE
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
1646 EAST TEMPLE VIEW DR.
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010
ROGER F. BARON
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
45 NORTH 100 EAST
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302

APPEALS

SHARON EBLEN
ATTORNEY FOR UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND «
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 3RD FLOOR
... ~
SALT LAKE CITY, UT

84114-6612

DOCi\£ J" NO

WH
FILED
JAN 1 31995

A A I I D T r\c APPFAL&

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

4

ARGUMENT

5
I.

II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RULED
CORRECTLY THAT THE STIPULATION IS
INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE ON SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT BIDDLE DID NOT VIEW HIS
CLAIM TO BE OF DOUBTFUL COMPENSABILITY. . . .

5

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RULED
CORRECTLY THAT, WHEN INJURED, BIDDLE WAS
WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH
STODDARD

7

CONCLUSION

9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:
Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Comm'n, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09
(Utah 1987)

6

M & K Corporation v. Industrial Comm/nf 189 P.2d 132, 134
(Utah 1948)

8

Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P.2d 582, 585-86
(Utah App. 1988)
Wilson v. Industrial Comm'n,
(Utah App. 1987)

1/5, 6, 7

735 P.2d 403, 405
6

RULES:
Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-16

1,4,6,9

STATUTES:
U.C.A. §35-1-86

1

U.C.A. §35-1-90

1, 4, 6, 7, 9

OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §27.41, 48 (1992)

8

Prosser on Torts (2d ed.), p. 352

8

Restatement, Agency, Section 228

8

11

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals of Utah has jurisdiction to review
these matters pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-86.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Both issues presented to the Court are subject to
limited review "and the judgment of the trier will not be
disturbed if based on substantial, competent, admissible
evidence,"

Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585

(Utah App. 1988).

The Court should show maximum deference to the

basic facts determined by the Industrial Commission and sustain
its judgment "if there is evidence of any substance that can be
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made."
Wilburnr 748 P.2d at 586.

PPTERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

1.

U.C.A. S35-1-90.

"No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to
compensation under this title shall be valid."
2.

Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-16.

Settlement Agreements.
"A.

Section 35-1-90, U.C.A., invalidates any agreement

which requires an employee to waive his rights.

Settlement

agreements are appropriate, however, when the parties, in good
faith, view the claim as one of the doubtful compensability."
1

,f

B.

In determining if a claim is of doubtful

compensability, the commission will look to the facts of the
matter and will not be bound by mere recitations in the
settlement agreement."

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The employer, Franklin Stoddard, asked Greg Biddle

to come to work for him in September, 1989.

(Record, p. 144,

lines 2-6).
2.

Mr. Stoddard acknowledges that Biddle did work for

him drilling water wells.
3.

(Record, p. 156, lines 17-20).

Mr. Biddle worked an average of forty hours per

week for Mr. Stoddard and was available to Mr. Stoddard anytime
during regular business hours.

(Record, p. 145, line 17 through

p. 146, line 16).
4.

Mr. Biddle never refused work offered him by his

employer, Mr. Stoddard.

(p. 145, line 17 through p. 146, line

16).
5.

Mr. Stoddard acknowledges that Mr. Biddle normally

rode with him to work; when Mr. Biddle reported to Stoddard's
house for work, Mr. Stoddard drove Biddle to the work site.

(p.

165, line 17 through p. 166, line 14).
6.

On the date of Mr. Biddle's accident, June 4, 1990,

Mr. Stoddard drove Biddle to work.
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(p. 157, lines 7-25).

7.

Mr. Stoddard stopped with Biddle to help Stoddard's

cousin set up a drilling rig —
hired Biddle to do.
8.

(p. 156, 1. 17-20; p. 157, 1.-7-25).

Mr. Stoddard estimates it takes one to two hours to

set up a drilling rig.
9.

the type of work Mr. Stoddard

(p. 158, 1. 4-7).

Despite the time required to set up his cousin's

drilling rig, Mr. Stoddard never told Biddle to stay off the work
site.

(p. 168, 1. 6-7).
10.

Mr. Stoddard did not tell Biddle not to do the

work setting up the drilling rig for Stoddard's cousin, (p. 168,
lines 8-11).
11.

Mr. Stoddard never told Biddle he was not working

for him at the time of the accident.
12.

(p. 147, 1. 16-25).

Mr. Biddle was unaware of any dispute regarding

the compensability of his claim or Mr. Stoddard's Workers'
compensation liability,
13.

(p. 148, 1. 23 through p. 149).

Nearly two years ago, at the February 3, 1993

hearing before Judge Elicerio of the Industrial Commission, Mr.
Stoddard's attorney stated why the uninsured Mr. Stoddard was
unable to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Biddle: "My
client really had no money at that time to pay Mr. Biddle
anything...." (p. 132, lines 16-17).
14.

In its Order and subsequent denials of Mr.

Stoddard's two Motions for Review, the Industrial Commission
invalidated the stipulation, finding there was no good-faith
dispute on the compensability of Biddle's claim; the Commission
3

also found Biddle within the course of his employment with
Stoddard at the time of his injury.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

U.C.A. §35-1-90 and Industrial Commission Rule

R568-1-16 provide that, unless the parties in good faith view a
claim as one of doubtful compensability, no agreement waiving an
employee's rights to workers' compensation shall be valid.

Mr.

Biddle never viewed his claim as doubtful, but always intended to
obtain his full benefits.

Mr. Stoddard never viewed the claim,

in good faith, as doubtful —

he entered the stipulation simply

because he was unable to meet his workers' compensation
obligation to Mr. Biddle.

The Industrial Commission was correct

in ruling the stipulation invalid and unenforceable.
2.

When injured, Mr. Biddle was within the course of

his employment with Mr. Stoddard.

He was rendering the service

he was hired by Mr. Stoddard to perform.

Mr. Stoddard never told

Mr. Biddle to stop, but was working with him at the time of
injury.

Stoddard had driven Biddle to the work site.

Mr. Biddle

had the impression he was expected to assist Mr. Stoddard as part
of his employment and was given no indication to the contrary.
Mr. Biddle's injuries are compensable.
3.

The Court should give maximum deference to the

Industrial Commission's findings and not disturb its ruling,
which was based on substantial evidence.
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4.

Mr. Biddle is entitled to additional workers'

compensation benefits from Mr. Stoddard as set forth in the Order
of the Industrial Commission, which the Court should affirm.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE
STIPULATION IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE ON SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT BIDDLE DID NOT VIEW HIS CLAIM TO BE OF
DOUBTFUL COMPENSABILITY.
Mr. Stoddard cites to Wilburn v. Interstate Electric,

748 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1988), as dispositive on the validity of
his stipulation with Biddle.

In Wilburn, this Court held:

[I]f the contract is ambiguous and the trial
forum finds facts respecting the intention of
the parties based on extrinsic evidence, the
appellate review is strictly limited and the
findings and judgment of the trier will not
be disturbed if based on substantial,
competent, admissible evidence.
Wilburn. 748 P.2d at 585 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
In accordance with Wilbyirn and Industrial Commission
Rule R568-1-16, the Administrative Law Judge received extrinsic
evidence at the February 3, 1993 hearing on the intention of the
parties.

Substantial, competent evidence was admitted showing

that Mr. Biddle did not intend to waive his rights to further
benefits or the payment of additional medical expenses. Mr.
Biddle never viewed his claim as one of doubtful compensability.
(Record, p. 148, line 23 through p. 149). He entered the
stipulation because Mr. Stoddard had no workers' compensation
insurance and had told Biddle he was unable to pay the claim.
5

Looking to the facts, as directed by Industrial Commission Rule
R568-1-16(B), the ALJ concluded that Mr. Biddle's claim was not
of doubtful compensability, because Mr. Biddle believed he had a
valid claim and was entitled to additional benefits in district
court.
As Mr. Stoddard points out, the test for determining
the enforceability of the stipulation is a subjective one:

WHAT

DID MR. BIDDLE BELIEVE?
[T]he issue was not so much whether the judge
believed the applicant sustained a
compensable accident as it was a matter of
what the parties believed and acted upon....
Wilburn, 748 P.2d at 586 (emphasis added.)

The record shows

that Mr. Biddle always believed he had a valid, compensable
claim.

He entered the stipulation with the understanding that he

could obtain additional workers' compensation in district court.
Pursuant to U.C.A. §35-1-90 and Rule R568-1-16, the ALJ ruled the
stipulation unenforceable, and the Industrial Commission twice
affirmed the ruling on review.
In WilburnP this court deferred to the Industrial
Commission:
[W]e give maximum deference to the basic
facts determined by the agency, which will be
sustained if there is evidence of any
substance that can be reasonably regarded as
supporting the determination made.
Wilson
v. Industrial Comm'n,. 735 P.2d 403, 405
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v.
Industrial Comm'n, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah
1987).
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Wilburn. supra (emphasis added).

Substantial evidence supports

the Industrial Commission's ruling that the stipulation is not
enforceable.

(Record, pages 132, 148, 149, among others).

The

stipulation, by which Stoddard seeks to shield himself from his
obligations, is invalid:

"No agreement by an employee to waive

his rights to compensation under this title shall be valid."
U.C.A. §35-1-90. The parties —

and Mr. Biddle in particular

—

did not view Mr. Biddle's claim to be of doubtful compensability.
Statement of Facts, paras. 12 and 13.

The Court should affirm

the Order of the Industrial Commission.

II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RULED CORRECTLY THAT, WHEN
INJURED, BIDDLE WAS WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH
STODDARD.
At the time of his injury, Mr. Biddle was within the

course of his employment with Mr. Stoddard.

In accordance with

Wilburnf 748 P.2d at 586, the Court should give maximum deference
to the facts determined by the Industrial Commission, which
include:
Finally, the ALJ finds that the applicant
felt he was working his regular job on June
4, 1990 and was never told anything to the
contrary. He was not told to remain in the
truck and Stoddard allowed him to assist with
the work on June 4, 1990. Therefore, any
argument that the appliance was acting as a
volunteer on June 4, 1990 and was not in the
course of his employment is not supportable.
Findings of Fact, March 8, 1993, page 6.

7

The Supreme Court of Utah, in M & K Corporation v.
Industrial Comrn'n, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948), held that an
injury occurs in the course of employment if
it occurs while the employee is rendering
service to his employer which he was hired to
do or doing something incidental thereto, at
the time when and the place where he was
authorized to render such service.
See alsof Prosser on Torts (2d ed.), p. 352; Restatement, Agency,
Section 228.
Mr. Stoddard hired Mr. Biddle to drill water wells.
(Record, p. 156, lines 17-20).

On the injury date, as he

normally did, Stoddard drove Biddle to the drilling site.
(Record, pages 156-57, 165-66).

Biddle was injured during normal

working hours while setting up a drilling rig, the type of work
Stoddard hired him to do.

(Record, pages 156-157).

Mr. Stoddard

was working with Biddle when he was injured and never instructed
Biddle to refrain from working.

(Record, page 168). Mr. Biddle

intended to benefit Mr. Stoddard, his employer, by assisting with
the drilling rig.

Biddle was rendering the service to Stoddard

which he was hired to do, or, at least, was doing something
incidental to his employment.

In either case, he satisfied the

"course of employment" test of M & K Corporation. above.
At the time of injury, Mr. Biddle was performing the
type of work he normally performed while employed by Stoddard.
Mr. Stoddard never told him to stop.

Professor Larson, in

Workmen's Compensation Law §27.41, 48 (1992) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added), states:

8

[W]hen any person in some authority directs
an employee to run some private errand or do
some work outside his normal duties for the
private benefit of the employer or superior,
an injury in the course of that work is
compensable.•.•
[T]he employer's "order" need not take the
form of an outright command, if in the
circumstances the employer's "suggestion" or
even the employee's impression of what is
expected of him in serving the interests of
his employer or superior are in fact
sufficient to motivate his undertaking the
service in question.
Under the circumstances, Mr. Biddle believed he was
expected to assist in the erection of Mr. Stoddard's cousin's
drilling rig.

Mr. Stoddard drove Mr. Biddle to the site,

explained why they were stopping, and never told Biddle not to
assist.

(Record, p. 168). It was Mr. Biddle's reasonable

impression that he was expected to help.

When injured while

doing so, Mr. Biddle was within the course of his employment with
Stoddard.

CONCLUSION
Under U.C.A. §35-1-90, Industrial Commission Rule R5681-16, and Utah case law, the parties' stipulation is invalid and
unenforceable, because Biddle and Stoddard did not in good faith
view the claim as one of doubtful compensability.

Mr. Stoddard

is liable to pay additional workers' compensation benefits,
because Biddle was an employee of Stoddard within the course of
his employment when injured.

Nearly five years after his

accident, Mr. Biddle is entitled to the workers' compensation
9

benefits set forth in the Order of the Industrial Commission,
which the Court should affirm.
DATED this

I1&

day of January, 1995.

Scotjt F. f>qi
Attorney for Respondent Biddle
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GREGORY LYNN BIDDLE this

<Z&

day of January, 1995, postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Roger F. Baron
Attorney for Petitioner Stoddard
45 North 100 East
Brigham City, UT 84302
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
Sharon Eblen
Attorney for Uninsured Employers' Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
Mr. Gregory Biddle
265 North 300 West, #19
Tremonton, UT 84337
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-90

compensation to a minor employee, such sum shall be paid only to his legally
appointed guardian.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, 8 89; C.L. 1917,
} 3150; ItS. 1933 & C. 1943,42-1-83; L. 1945,
ch. 65, § 1.

Cross-References. — Right of action by
parents for injury to child, 5 78-11-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction and application.
This section was enacted to enable a minor
not under statutory prohibitions to enter into
lawful contracts for the rendering of personal
service and to assure him, and incidentally the

employer, the same protection as an adult rendering like service. Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet
Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885
(1945).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

CJS. — 99 C. J.S. Workmen's Compensation
} 122.

35-1-90. Void agreements between employers and employees.
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this
title shall be valid. No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any employer who deducts any
portion of such premium from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to
the benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more
than $100 for each such offense.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 90; C.L. 1917,
§ 3151; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-84.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Agreements to settle claims.
Effect of agreements of settlement.
Rights of commission.
Constitutionality.
This section, invalidating agreements by employees to waive rights under the act (§ 35-1-1
et seq.), is not unconstitutional. Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371,135
R2d 266 (1943).
Agreements to settle claims.
Agreements to settle claims after the injury
probably would be invalid under this section.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73
Utah 366, 274 P. 139 (1929); Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 P.2d 266
(1943).
There is nothing in this section that either
expressly or impliedly restricts right of em-

ployer and employee to make settlements or
imposes conditions thereupon. Accordingly, employer and employee's dependents may make
settlement for employee's death after an award
by commission since such settlement does not
amount to a waiver within meaning of that
term as used in this section. Brigham Young
University v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 349,
279 P. 889, 65 A.L.R. 152 (1929).
This section was no bar to enforceability of a
settlement agreement, where there was evidence to support an administrative law judge's
finding that the parties had a good faith dispute
as to the compensability of the claim, notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' determination
that it "would have no difficulty" in finding the
claim compensable. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec,
748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Effect of agreements of settlement.
It is the intention of the Legislature to prevent agreements of final settlement between
employer, employee, and the insurance carrier

261

41Z

suing a check payable to the worker and hiR attorney
jointly constitutes a violation of this rule.
R568-1-14. Acceptance/Denial of a Claim.
A. Upon receiving a claim for benefits from an injured employee, the carrier/self-msured employer
shall promptly investigate the claim and begin payment of compensation within 21 days of a valid claim
or the carrier shall send the claimant written notice,
within 21 days, that further investigation is needed
and the reasons for further investigation. Each carrier or self-insured employer shall complete its investigation within 45 days of teccipt of the claim and
shall commence the payment of benefits or notify the
claimant in writing that the claim is denied.
B. The payment of compensation shall be considered overdue if not paid within 21 days of a valid
claim or within the 45 days of investigation unless
denied.
C. Failure to make payment without good cause
shall result in referral of insurance companies to the
Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary
action and may be cause for revocation of the Certificate of Self-Insurance from self-insured employers.
D. If a carrier or self-insurer begins payment of
benefits on an investigation basis so as to process the
claim in a timely fashion, the later denial of benefits
based on newly discovered information shall be allowed.
R568-1-15. Compensation Agreements.
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or employer may enter into a compensation agreement for
the purpose of resolving a worker's compensation
claim. Compensation agreements must be approved
by the Commission. The compensation agreement
must be that contained on Form 019 of the Industrial
Commission forms and shall include the following information:
1. Signatures of the parties involved;
2. Form 122 * Employer's First Report of Injury;
3. Form 123 - Physician's Initial Report;
4. Doctor's report of impairment rating;
5. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement.
B. Failure to provide any of the above documentation and forms shall result in the return of the compensation agreement to the carrier or self-insured
employer without approval.
R568-1-16. Settlement Agreements.
A. Section 35-1-90, U.C.A., invalidates any agreement which requires an employee to waive his rights.
Settlement agreements are appropriate, however,
when the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one
of doubtful compensability.
B. In determining if a claim is of doubtful compensability, the Commission will look to the facts of the
matter and will not be bound by mere recitations in
the settlement agreement.
C. The Commission encourages the settlement of
disputed claims on an amicable basis whenever possible. If the claim is not of doubtful compensability, the
settlement agreement must be open-ended to the extent allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Parties will be bound by their agreement to pay and
receive a given amount of compensation for a given
injury.
D. Settlement agreements involving claims of
doubtful compensability shall be subject to approval
by the Commission.
, E. The agreement shall be final and not subject to
further review upon the same facts merely because of
subsequent dissatisfaction.

F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use
by parties desirous of settling claims of doubtful compensability.
R568-M7. Permanent Total Disability.
A. The Commission is required under Section
35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of total disability
as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use of the term "substance of
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to
confer some latitude on the Commission in exercising
a degree of discretion in making its findings relative
to permanent total disability. The Commission does
not interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training and/or
evaluation has been accomplished.
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process
of making, a determination of disability under the
foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own
behalf.
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a significant cause of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or
causes.
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total
disability the Commission shall rely upon and be
guided by the rules of disability determination published by the Social Security Administration Office of
Disability publication SSA Pub No. 64-014, as
amended. In short, the sequential decision making
process referred to requires a series of questions and
evaluations to be made in sequence. These are:
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful
activity?
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the
listed impairments in Appendix 1 of SSA Pub. No.
64-014?
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from
doing his or her previous work9
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant shall be referred to the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable
to do any other work because of his age, education,
and previous work experience, and as a result of an
industrial accident, there shall be a hearing to review
the determination of the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing.
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the
parties, the Commission shall issue an order finding
or denying permanent total disability based upon the
preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the vocational factors in combination with
the residual functional capacity as detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014.
R568-1-18. Burial Expenses.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-81, U.C.A., as amended in
1992, if death results from an industrial injury or
occupational disease, burial expenses in ordinary
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
February 3, 1993 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by
Scott F. Squire, Attorney.
The defendant, W. Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well
& Exploration Drilling, was represented by Roger F.
Baron, Attorney.
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by
Thomas Sturdy, Attorney.

This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation
(TTC), additional medical expenses and permanent impairment
benefits (PPI) related to a June 4, 1990 industrial injury. The
present adjudication was initiated by an application for hearing
filed by the applicant on July 14, 1992. However, the applicant
did file an application for hearing regarding the same injury in
October of 1990. At that time, the applicant was represented by
Gregory Skabelund, Attorney. The prior application for hearing did
not result in a hearing, because the matter was settled pursuant to
a settlement agreement approved by another ALJ in July of 1991.
That agreement involved the payment of a specified sum of medical
expenses in exchange for the applicant's agreement to have the
action dismissed with prejudice. The more recent application for
hearing claims additional medical expenses, as well as compensation

ORDER
RE: GREGORY L. BIDDLE
PAGE 2

(TTC and PPI)• The defendant uninsured employer answered the more
recent application for hearing indicating that the applicant was
barred from claiming additional benefits associated with the June
4, 1990 injury as he had waived his right to further benefits
pursuant to the July 1991 agreement. The applicant argues that the
prior agreement does not bar him from claiming additional benefits
associated with the June 4, 1990 industrial injury.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 27 years old on the date of
injury and who had no dependents then or at this time.
The
applicant indicates that he was hired by W. F. Stoddard around
September of 1989 at a wage rate of $4.00 plus per hour. Per
Stoddard, he became aware that the applicant was available for work
through a man he referred to as Mr. Butler. Stoddard cannot recall
if he spoke directly to the applicant regarding the terms of his
hire, or merely told Butler what to tell the applicant.
Per
Exhibit A-l (a chronological listing of the total hours worked by
the applicant for Stoddard) the applicant began working for
Stoddard on September 20, 1989. Per Exhibit A-l, the applicant
worked from then through December 8, 1989, 4 to 6 days per week,
averaging around 35 to 40 hours per week. From December 8, 1989
through February of 1990, the applicant did not work and then he
began working for Stoddard again in March of 1990, 4 to 6 days per
week, averaging around 35 to 40 hours per week until he was injured
on June 4, 1990 (per Exhibit A-l). Taking an average of the hours
worked per week overall, the average number of hours per week was
38.91 hours.
Stoddard testified that he does not ajgree that
Exhibit A-l is an accurate listing of the hours that the applicant
worked for Stoddard, because the hours listed includes travel time
to and from the job. Stoddard claims that the wage rate was $4.00
per hour and nothing more than that.
The applicant stated that he was hired to work on drilling
rigs run by Stoddard.
Stoddard testified that his business
involved drilling water wells for customers who used the wells for
agricultural pursuits or domestic water use. The applicant stated
that he was expected to work everyday and was available to do this,
but that some days there was no work to do and thus he stayed home.
Apparently, on most occasions, Stoddard actually drove the
applicant to the site where the drilling was going on and then
drove the applicant home again at the end of the work day. The
applicant stated that Stoddard paid him sporadically when he
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himself got paid by his clients/customers. In fact, Exhibit A-l
shows that the applicant got infrequent payments of either $250.00
or $200.00 from Stoddard, with occasional other payments of smaller
odd amounts.
On June 4, 1990, Stoddard was apparently on his way to a
regular drilling site with the applicant in his vehicle. Per
Stoddard, on the way, he stopped to assist his cousin on a well he
was digging in or near Thatcher, Utah. Per Stoddard, he did not
expect the applicant to assist him at this site, but he states he
did not specifically tell the applicant NOT to assist hinr. The
applicant did assist setting up a drill rig at this site and got
his fingers crushed by a pipe doing so around 10:00 A.M. The only
medical record that was presented at hearing was a June 8, 1992
office note of a Dr. J. Malouf from Logan Utah.
This note
indicates that it was the applicant's left middle and ring fingers
that were injured in the accident with pseudoarthritis and loss of
mormal joint architecture in the fingers.
The office note
indicates that the applicant was unable to perform his normal line
of work from June 4, 1990 through October 15, 1990 as a result of
the injury. He found that the applicant had an 11% hand permanent
impairment resulting from the June 4, 1990 industrial accident.
Per the prior settlement agreement, the applicant incurred expenses
related to the June 4, 1990 injury at the Western Surgery Center in
Logan, Utah, Bear River Valley Hospital in Tremonton, Utah, Logan
Regional Hospital in Logan, Utah, with Dr. Malouf and with Mountian
West Physical Therapy. At the time of the hearing, the applicant
indicated that there were still outstanding balances of $28.76 at
Logan Radiology and $1,025.71 at Mountain West Physical Therapy.
At the time of the hearing, the defendant uninsured employer
argued that: 1) the applicants claim for additional benefits
related to the June 4, 1990 accident was barred due to the prior
agreement and 2) that even if that agreement did not bar a further
claim, the defendant was not liable to pay any benefits to the
applicant as the defendant was not an employer required to cover
the applicant's job injuries because: A) the applicant was only a
casual employee and thus no coverage was required and/or B) the
employer is an agricultural employer per U.C.A. 35-1-42 (3)(a),
because the employer's business involved digging wells for
agricultural usage.
With respect to the first argument, the ALJ informed the
parties at hearing that any agreement that sought to limit the
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applicant's entitlement to benefits had to be in compliance with
the Commission rule R568-1-16 (i.e. the agreement must be one where
the parties in good faith believe the claim involved to be one of
doubtful compensability). The applicant testified that he agreed
to enter into the July 1991 agreement only because the employer was
uninsured and he felt he had no recourse because the employer
indicated inability to pay the full claim. Also, the applicant
testified that his prior attorney told him that they could pursue
the employer in civil court for compensation.
The applicant
indicated that he was unaware that he could have gotten an award of
compensation at the Commission. Finally, he stated that he felt
the agreement was that the employer would pay all the medical
expenses related to the industrial injury and that the $5,100.00
stated in the agreement was the full amount of all the expenses and
not a limit on what the employer was required to pay.
The
applicant did acknowledge that he knew that the employer was
arguing at the time of the prior application for hearing that the
employer owed him nothing on his claim.
. With respect to the July 1991 agreement, the employer argues
that the agreement clearly states that the action would be
dismissed with prejudice based on the limited payment of $5,100.00
in medical expenses. Because the prior application does indicate
a claim for compensation in addition to medical expenses, the
employer argues that the applicant was waiving this claim for
compensation in agreeing to the with-prejudice dismissal. The
employer points to the prior answer filed in response to the
initial application for hearing. The employer argues that that
answer (Exhibit D-l) clearly shows that the employer felt the claim
was one of doubtful compensability, because the answer indicates
that Stoddard was not an employer due to the casual employment and
the agricultural exemptions. Stoddard testified that he understood
that the prior agreement settled the applicant's claim in its
entirety. Finally, the Uninsured Employers Fund argues that the
applicant was not acting as Stoddard's employee when he was injured
(because Stoddard was just helping out his cousin at the time) and
thus this is an additional reason why the applicant's claim was of
doubtful compensability.
With respect to his solvency, Stoddard testified that the
only real property that he owns is the property on which his shop
is located in Honeyville, Utah. Stoddard testified that he owns
this outright and the property is not mortgaged. He indicated that
he also owns a couple of trucks outright and some business
equipment. Stoddard did not indicate the value of the property,
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the equipment or the trucks. Stoddard stated that his business is
still operating and that it made $13,000.00 last year. However, he
stated that he owes $800.00 per month in alimony, he has an income
tax liability, and that he is still paying on the $3,000.00 loan
that he took out to pay off the applicant's medical expenses. In
addition, he stated he had the normal monthly expenses for rent,
food and utilities.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial injury on
June 4, 1990 and his claim is not barred by the prior settlement
agreement or any provision in U.C.A. 35-1-42 or 35-1-43. With
respect to the prior settlement agreement, the ALJ notes that the
Commission rule (R568-1-16) requires that the ALJ is to consider
all the facts surrounding the claim in determining whether it was
one of doubtful compensability and is not to rely simply on the
recitations in the agreement. In this case, the employer relies
heavily on the recitation in the agreement with respect to the
applicant's agreement to a with-prejudice dismissal. However, the
ALJ finds that the employer may have understood what this meant,
but the applicant did not. In fact, the applicant felt that he
could still pursue compensation, but per his prior attorney's
instructions, he felt he needed to do this in another forum.
Therefore, the ALJ feels that the agreement's recitation regarding
dismissal is not an indication that the applicant understood his
claim to be one of disputed validity.
The ALJ also finds that the applicant may have understood
that the employer was arguing that he owed the applicant nothing,
but did not agree that there was any arguable basis for this. The
applicant clearly did not consider his employment to be "casual."
The only evidence presented on the issue of when the applicant
worked shows he worked 4 to 6 days per week continuously for months
at a time doing work that was in the usual course of Stoddard's
business. Therefore, there is no basis in fact for the employer's
argument that the applicant came under the casual employee
exemption found in U.C.A. 35-1-43(1)(b) and the ALJ is not
impressed that the applicant could have believed there was any
basis in fact for this argument. The applicant also clearly did
not consider Stoddard to be an agricultural employer, simply
because he dug some wells that were used for agricultural purposes.
The ALJ finds that the plain meaning of "agricultural employer" as
it is used in U.C.A. 35-1-42(3)(a) is an employer engaged in crop
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production or possibly animal husbandry, but not an employer who is
engaged in the business of digging wells. Therefore, once again,
there is no basis in fact for the employer's argument that he was
an exempt employer under the statute and for this reason the ALJ
cannot believe that the applicant could have believed there was any
basis in fact for this argument.
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ feels that the there is no
legitimate argument that the applicant's claim was one of disputed
validity and there is no convincing evidence that the applicant
understood his claim to be one of disputed validity. In addition,
the agreement itself does not even recite that the applicant was
waiving a claim for future benefits associated with the June 4,
1990 industrial injury. The indication that the "action" could be
dismissed with prejudice is unclear in reference as to what
"action" was being dismissed. Finally, the ALJ finds that the
applicant felt he was working his regular job on June 4, 1990 and
was never told anything to the contrary. He was not told to remain
in the truck and Stoddard allowed him to assist with the work on
June 4, 1990. Therefore, any argument that the applicant was
acting as a volunteer on June 4, 1990 and was not in the course of
his employment is not supportable. The fact that the customer
happened to be a relative of Stoddard does not cause the work to be
outside Stoddard's normal course of business. Therefore, there is
no doubtful compensability based on a course-of-employment
argument. Because the ALJ finds that the applicant's claim was not
one of questionnable compensability and because the ALJ is not
convinced that the applicant understood the prior agreement to
waive any right to a further claim for compensation related to the
June 4, 1990 industrial accident, the ALJ finds the applicant is
not barred from claiming additional benefits associated with that
accident.
As the ALJ has determined that the outside-the-course-ofemployment defense and the defenses with respect to exemption are
not sustainable and as no other arguments have been raised with
respect to the compensability of the applicant's June 4, 1990
injury, the ALJ finds that injury to be compensable.
As the
applicant has not waived any right to benefits associated with that
accident, he is due the remainder of his medical expenses, TTC and
PPI (based on the only medical evidence submitted, Dr. Malouf's
June 8, 1992 office note) . The remainder of the expenses for Logan
Radiology ($28.76) and Mountain West Physical Therapy ($1,025.72)
need to be paid. In addition, the applicant is due TTC for the
19.143 weeks indicated in Dr. Malouf's office note (June 4, 1990
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through October 15, 1990) and PPI for 18.48 weeks based on the 11%
hand impairment rated by Dr. Malouf (168 weeks for the hand based
on U.C.A. 35-1-66 (A)(2)(a) x .11). The applicant's compensation
rate is based on an average weekly wage of $155.60 ($4.00 per hour
x 38.91 hours per week) and computes to $104.00/week ($155.60 x
.667). This makes the TTC award tp be $1,990.87 ($104.00 x. 19.143
weeks) and the PPI award to be $1,921.92 ($104.00 x. 18.48 weeks).
Attorney fees are based on Commission rule R568-1-7 at 20% of the
benefits awarded and amount to $782.56 ($1,990.87 + $1,921.92 =
$3,912.79 x .20).
Although the ALJ is no accountant, per Stoddard's testimony
regarding his assets and liabilities, it appears that Stoddard is
not in a position to be able to pay the applicant's claim, as his
liabilities completely exhaust his income. It is unclear what the
value of his real or business property is and thus the ALJ finds
that he is unable to pay the applicant's claim, giving rise to the
liability of the Uninsured Employers Fund per U.C.A. 35-1-107.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund,
pay the applicant, Gregory Biddle, temporary total compensation at
the rate of $104.00 per week, for 19.143 weeks, or a total of
$1,990.87, for the period of medical instability associated with
the June 4, 1990 industrial accident, from June 4, 1990 through
October 15, 1990.
That amount is accrued and due and payable in
a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and
less attorney fees to be awarded below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund, pay
the applicant, Gregory Biddle, permanent impairment benefits, at
the rate of $104.00 per week, for 18.48 weeks, or a total of
$1,921.92, for the 11% hand impairment sustained by the applicant
as a result of the June 4, 1990 industrial accident. That amount
is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8%
per annum per U.C.A. 35-1-78.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund pay
the outstanding medical expenses incurred as the result of the June
4, 1990 industrial accident; said expenses to be paid in accordance
with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Industrial
Commission of Utah.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund pay
Scott F. Squire, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $782.56,
plus 20% of the interest payable on the award, for services
rendered in.this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid
award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office
of Scott F. Squire.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall
retain full reimbursement rights against the uninsured employer, W.
Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well and Exploration Drilling, based on
the payment ordered herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utatj,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this
J
day of ~~?77*^J^
,1993.
ATTEST:

^L

i^

Patricia 0. Ash _
Commission Secretary
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
GREGORY LYNN BIDDLE,
Applicant,
V.

W. FRANKLIN STODDARD dba WATER
WELL & EXPLORATION DRILLING and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,
Respondents.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER GRANTING
IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART
MOTION FOR REVIEW
Case No. 92000861

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the
motion for review of respondent in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63
-46b-12.
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are
applicable in this case.
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the
commission." U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953).
The statutes further provide that:
A substantial compliance with the requirements of
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give
effect to the orders of the commission, and they
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void
for any omission of a technical nature.
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953).
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to ... administer and enforce all laws
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a)(1953), and to "consider
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953).
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88
(1965) which provides:
...The commission may make its investigation in
such manner as in its judgment is best calcula-
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ted to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of
the Workmen,s Compensation Act.
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision- This
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers'
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules.
Id.
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena.
The respondents filed motions for review asking the commission
to review the order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) with
regard to the following:
(1) Does the applicant's prior commission approved stipulation
which agreed to the dismissal of an earlier application for a
hearing bar this application for benefits?
(2) Was the applicant within the course of his employment at
the time of the injury?
(3) Was there sufficient proof to establish liability for the
uninsured fund?
I. DOES THE APPLICANT'S PRIOR STIPULATION
BAR THE APPLICANT'S CURRENT APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS?
The applicant had an accident on June 4, 1990 in which two
fingers on his left hand were crushed while he was helping to
assemble a drilling rig. The applicant filed an application for a
hearing on October 23, 1990, seeking payment of medical expenses,
temporary total compensation and permanent total disability. On
July 10, 1991 an order was issued by the commission adopting a
stipulation and dismissing the applicant's claim with prejudice.
The parties stipulated that:
The parties in the above-entitled action,
hereby stipulate that W. Franklin Stoddard dba
Water Well and Exploration Drilling will pay
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the medical expenses of the Applicant, Gregory
Lynn Biddle, in a sum not to exceed $5,100.
Following said payment, Applicant agrees that
this action shall be dismissed with prejudice.
An order appended to the stipulation provided that:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to the
above stipulation, that W. Franklin Stoddard
dba Water Well and Exploration Drilling pay all
of Applicant's uninsured medical expenses
incurred as a result of the industrial accident
dated the 4th day of June, 1990 as outlined
below up to $5,100:
The order then listed six medical providers and the amounts to be
paid.
Neither the order nor stipulation states that the claim was
one of disputed validity, although the stipulation does state that
the application is to be dismissed with prejudice.
Under Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P.2d 582 (Utah App.
1988), the commission must examine the evidence of the intent of
the parties at the time of the agreement to determine whether the
parties viewed the claim as one of disputed validity. This
requirement has been adopted by rule R568-1-16.
The ALJ examined the evidence presented by the parties and
found that the applicant's testimony showed that the applicant did
not view the claim to be of doubtful compensability at the time he
entered into the stipulation. The applicant testified that he
agreed to the stipulation because the employer was uninsured and he
felt he had no recourse because the employer had indicated that he
was unable to pay the entire claim. The applicant also testified
that his attorney represented that he could recover the unpaid
compensation and disability benefits in an action in district
court. Finally, the applicant stated that he believed that the
agreement provided that the employer would pay all the medical
expenses related to the industrial injury and that the total of
those bills was $5,100.00.
The testimony further showed, and the ALJ found that the
employer believed that the settlement resolved the matter entirely.
Based upon the above findings of fact, the ALJ concluded that the
claim was not one of disputed validity, since the applicant
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believed that he had a valid claim and could recover the balance of
his award in district court.
It further appears that the agreement contained a mistake of
fact with regard to the payment necessary to pay all of the
applicant's medical bills, and is voidable. The Workers'
Compensation Act provides that "the responsibility for compensation
and payment of medical ... expenses .. shall be on the employer and
its insurance carrier and not on the employee." U.C.A. § 3 5-1-45.
Therefore, we find that the stipulation of the parties is not
enforceable and, therefore, will not bar to the applicant's claim
for additional benefits. We further find that the applicant is not
liable for the payment of the medical bills which remain unpaid as
a result of the mistake contained in the settlement agreement.
II. WAS THE APPLICANT WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY?
The ALJ found that the applicant was hired by the respondent
to work on water well drilling rigs. The applicant believed that
he was expected to work everyday unless there was no work. On most
days the respondent drove the applicant to the work site in the
morning and home at the end of the day. On June 4, 1990, the day
of the accident, the men were on their way to a job site when the
respondent stopped to assist his cousin in setting up the cousin's
rig. The respondent did not expect the applicant to help with this
work, but he did not specifically tell the applicant not to help.
The applicant did assist in setting up the rig and got his fingers
crushed by a pipe around 10:00 a.m..
"Each employee ... who is injured...,by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury
occurred, ... shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury.... U.C.A. § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1988). The work
the applicant performed on the date of his injury was of the same
type that the applicant normally performed for the respondent
during the course of his employment. Although the applicant was
not ordered to help, he was also not told not to help. According
to Professor Larson, ,f[w]hen any person in some authority directs
an employee to run some private errand or do some work outside his
normal duties for the private benefit of the employer or superior,
an injury in the course of that work is compensable.ff
Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law § 27.41 (1992) [citations omitted].
Further,
...the employer's 'order' need not take the
form of an outright command, if in the
circumstances the employer's 'suggestion' or
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even the employee's impression of what is
expected of him in serving the interests of his
employer or superior, are in fact sufficient to
motivate his undertaking the service in
question.
Id. at § 27.48 (emphasis added). We believe, based upon the
evidence in the record, that under the circumstances, the applicant
believed that he was expected to assist in the erection of the
drilling rig on the date he was injured. The respondent did
nothing to stop or discourage him from helping. We agree with the
ALJ that the applicant was within the course of his employment at
the time of his injury and, therefore, the injury is compensable.
III. WAS THE EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S INABILITY
TO PAY SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY FOR THE
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND?
The Uninsured Employers' Fund (Fund) asserts that the evidence
in the record was insufficient to trigger liability of the Fund.
Respondent Stoddard testified that he owns his shop building, some
tools and the lot that his shop sits on free and clear. Stoddard
did not know what this property was worth. Stoddard also owns a
1962 International Harvester 10 wheel truck with a drilling rig
mounted on it and a 1978 1 ton work truck. Stoddard has a Ford 10
wheeler with a drilling rig, which has an outstanding balance owed.
Stoddard borrowed $7,000.00 against the Ford to pay the applicant
pursuant to the prior settlement agreement. Stoddard also
testified that his net income was $13,000.00 last year. His
monthly obligations included $800.00 for alimony which is deducted
from his income for tax purposes, $250.00 for income tax, the
$3,000.00 balance on the loan to pay the applicant and food and
utility expenses.
The only evidence presented to establish the employer's
insolvency was Stoddard's testimony. The testimony was not
corroborated by bank statements or tax records, and did not
establish the value of Stoddard's primary assets, his shop building
and the land upon which it sits. The statute creating the Fund
does not address the allocation of the burden of proof of
establishing an employer's insolvency.
In the present case, we do not believe that the employer's
insolvency was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Without
evidence of the value of the employer's real property or trucks, we
cannot determine that Stoddard was insolvent or otherwise unable to
pay the award.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the
administrative law judge dated March 8, 1993, is affirmed with
regard to the rulings that the compensation agreement was not
enforceable and that the applicant's injuries arose out of and in
the course of his employment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order of the
administrative law judge which found that the respondent is
insolvent is hereby reversed and remanded with instructions that
the administrative law judge take additional evidence on the value
of the respondent's assets and issue a supplemental order regarding
the respondent's solvency and the liability of the Uninsured
Emp1oyers' Fund.
DATED this SIX

day of

(D^jfcJLc* J

.

1993.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
GREGORY LYNN BIDDLE,

*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.

*

W. FRANKLIN STODDARD, dba
WATER WELL & EXPLORATION
DRILLING and UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS FUND,

*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW

*

Case No. 92-0861

*

Defendants.

*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah has reviewed this matter
once before. At that time, the Commission held that Gregory Lynn
Biddle was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment with W. Franklin Stoddard. The Commission also
concluded that a prior settlement agreement between Mr. Biddle and
Mr. Stoddard did not bar Mr. Biddle from pursuing additional
workers' compensation benefits.
The Commission remanded this
matter to an Administrative. Law Judge to determine whether Mr.
Stoddard was insolvent, in which case the Uninsured Employers Fund
("UEF11 hereafter) would be liable for Mr. Biddle's additional
benefits.
Pursuant to the Commission's Order of Remand, the ALJ held an
additional hearing on the issue of Mr. Stoddard's solvency and
found Mr. Stoddard to be insolvent. Mr. Stoddard and UEF ("the
Defendants") then filed their respective Motions For Review,
thereby bringing this matter before the Commission once again.
In their Motions For Review, neither Mr. Stoddard nor the UEF
challenge the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Stoddard is insolvent.
Instead, they renew the arguments raised in their first set of
Motions For Review, that Mr. Biddle's injury is not compensable and
that Mr. Biddle's earlier settlement agreement with Mr. Stoddard
bars further benefits.
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over these Motion For
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-182.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
v,

The Commission affirms and adopts the findings of fact set
forth in the ALJ's decision.
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DISCUSSION AND ORDER
As noted above, neither Mr. Stoddard nor the UEF challenge the
ALJ / s finding on the issue of Mr. Stoddard's solvency.
The
Commission therefore adopts the ALJ's finding that Mr. Stoddard is
insolvent.
As to Defendants renewed arguments that Mr. Biddle's injury
is not compensable and that Mr. Biddle is bound by his prior
settlement agreement, the Commission has already considered those
points in its original decision. The Commission hereby reaffirms
its prior decision for the reasons stated therein.
In light of the foregoing, the Commission denies Defendants'
Motions For Review. It is so ordered.
Dated this /JjZMay

of July, 1994.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order.

